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Abstract
A key characteristic of the spread of infectious diseases is their ability to use efficient transmission paths within
contact graphs. This enables the pathogen to maximise infection rates and spread within a target population. In this
work, we devise techniques to localise infections and decrease infection rates based on a principled analysis of disease
transmission paths within human-contact networks (proximity graphs). Experimental results of disease transmission
confirms that contact tracing requires both significant visibility (at least 60%) into the proximity graph and the ability
to place half of the population under isolation, in order to stop the disease. We find that pro-actively isolating super-
links — key proximity encounters – has significant benefits — targeted isolation of a fourth of the population based
on 35% visibility into the proximity graph prevents an epidemic outbreak. It turns out that isolating super-spreaders is
more effective than contact tracing and testing but less effective than targeting super-links. We highlight the important
role of topology in epidemic outbreaks. We argue that proactive innoculation of a population by disabling super-links
and super-spreaders may have an important complimentary role alongside contact tracing and testing as part of a
sophisticated public-health response to epidemic outbreaks.
1 Introduction
There has been rapid progress in understanding how infectious diseases spread organically, how the disease growth
affects topology, and how the topology in turn affects disease interventions and the number of infected individuals.
There is now substantial literature on the topic: see literature surveys [17, 36] and book length introduction to disease
propagation [1, 12, 15].
Early work modeled outbreaks of infectious diseases as a randomised stochastic process where every possible con-
tact between an infected and a susceptible individual was equally likely [26, 27, 47]. These models assume a disease
transmission network that is modeled by an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph [18], which is mathematically interesting but does not
model real-world contact patterns accurately. In real networks, the infection chain may consist of individuals who are
likely to be pairwise acquainted. In the case of a respiratory disease like Covid-19, for successful transmission, two in-
dividuals must be in contact that is sufficiently close enough to enable the transmission of the respiratory disease [19].
Thus it is likely that many successful transmissions involve pairwise acquaintances rather than contact between ran-
dom individuals. In other words, while the random contact model is a good first approximation, in real networks the
path-lengths are likely to be a lot smaller leading to faster disease transmission than modeled previously. This is known
as the ’small-world’ concept and it was first popularised in the context of social networks by the sociologist Stanley
Milgram in 1967 [37]. Indeed existing epidemiology models use the reproduction number R0 parameter as central
component of their framework. R0 represents the average number of infections caused by an infected person, and is
assumed to be distributed according to a Normal distribution (assuming a purely random contact contact pattern).
Connectivity plays a significant role in the spread of infectious diseases. Epidemiologists and medical practitioners
expend much effort in tracking down people who were in the proximity of an infected person, followed by isolating
them, and testing them. Techniques such as proactive screening of the population and testing random samples for
pathogens all require significant effort. Additionally, these measures are said to work best when dealing with local
clusters of infection. In particular, they don’t scale to protect large populations especially against a virus like SARS-
CoV-2 that has a significant incubation period of 7 days [2]. When diseases start spreading over networks of inter-
personal contacts, responders can rapidly lose control of the situation. In the absence of appropriate interventions the
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numbers of infections and deaths rapidly increase and responders may be left with no other option but to isolate the
entire population (lockdown). Aside from the severe economic and social repercussions, a lockdown does not stop the
disease as transmission resumes soon after the suspension is lifted. As such social lockdowns are a one-off emergency
measure that cannot be repeatedly applied due to the volatility they induce within human societies.
Targeted interventions can be much more effective and efficient. The intuition is that a small number of key indi-
viduals are believed to play a major role in disease transmission. Indeed many countries have successfully disrupted
the spread of HIV/AIDS by targeting sex workers [41]. In contrast the efforts to contain Covid-19 have been largely
restricted to the deployment of contact tracing combined with testing and isolation [11, 3, 24, 50, 21, 51, 48]. As an
disease response strategy this is fairly “leaky” – even if a fraction of contacts remain untraced or unknown, then the
disease continues to spread picking up pace soon after. As such “leakages” are hard to detect and expensive to contain.
To automate contact tracing, apps based on pseudonymous Bluetooth beacons are at a stage of early deployment in
many countries. However they require at least 60% of the population to adopt it in order to gain control of the disease.
Current reports [16] indicate the adoption rates to be in the range of between 12% to 40%, crucially limiting the effi-
cacy of a targeted strategy based on contact-tracing. There are a number of example contact tracing applications, for
example bluetrace [3] and [11].
In this study, we systematically analyse various elements of human communication structures to develop sophis-
ticated proactive isolation strategies that compliment contact tracing approaches. Is it possible, for example, to slow
down or entirely stop the spread of an epidemic by pro-actively isolating (or quarantining) key individuals who play
a vital role in disease spreading due to their positionality in the contact network. Is it possible that a low vertex-order
node who has contacts within different groups of people who may otherwise have no contact with each other should
be encouraged to self-isolate? There is loose precedent in epidemiology literature which discusses the concept of
super-spreaders defined as high vertex-order nodes play a disproportionate role in disease spreading. However such
nodes may simply be individuals with essential roles such as a bus driver or a nurse, who happen to interact with a
large number of people within a short span of time. We answer key research questions: Is it possible to identify key
individuals that must pro-actively self-isolate using the contact graph alone? Is it possible to identify such individu-
als even at low rates of app adoption? and, how to achieve this in a privacy-preserving manner, moving away from
extremes such as undertaking pan-societal lockdown measures.
2 Evaluation framework for measuring disease propagation
The focus of our work is on the probability that a susceptible individual will become an infected individual. Given an
initial infection source within a population, we wish to be able to determine transmission chains – who infected whom
– leading to the requirement to identify both infectious and susceptible individuals. The determination of infected
or infectious individuals is driven by the probability that a specific individual is the originator of a given (infection)
transmission chain. Similarly, identifying the set of susceptible individuals who are potentially at risk from an infection
chain originating at a certain individual is also an important requirement to combat an infectious disease.
The objective of our analysis is to determine how the topology of disease propagation affects the efforts of public
health responders in identifying the endpoints of an transmission chain using contact tracing approaches. The effec-
tiveness of such interventions depends on the topology of the propagation network. A disease intervention mechanism
should help responders. If responders are unable to narrow down on susceptible individuals at risk of joining an infec-
tion chain beyond their initial knowledge prior to the intervention, then the propagation network can be described as
being resistant to an intervention strategy.
We are interested in the effects of topology alone and ignore the effects of vaccination, acquired immunity, and
changing rates of infectiousness on disease propagation.
2.1 Measuring disease
There are several ways to measure disease propagation. Conventional approaches typically use the counts of suscep-
tible, infected, infectious, and recovered individuals over time. These counts help understand the current status of
disease propagation but provide no understanding of the network’s (future) capacity for disease propagation. If we
think of the network as a communication channel – where the efficiency of disease spreading (communication) is a
function of channel (network topology) efficiency – then we can see that tools from Shannon theory of communica-
tions, specifically the capacity measures can be used to better understand disease transmission.
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We therefore introduce a new metric, called the disease transmission potential of a network defined as the quantum
of disease transmission that can occur due to a single infection occurring anywhere within the network. This is
mathematically represented as the entropy of the probability distribution of contracting an infection over all individuals
within a population. This can also be equivalently understood as the amount of information the public-health responder
is missing in order to identify the susceptible individuals that are most at risk of being infected. Low potential means
there isn’t much work remaining to be done in terms of identifying infectious individuals and isolating them from the
susceptible population. On the other hand, high potential implies the responder has little knowledge and therefore high
uncertainty about what network elements to disable in order to stop transmission.
I = E [βi] =
−∑iPr[βi]log2Pr[βi]
log2N
(1)
Transmission potential of a network is highest when all individuals within a population are at their maximal
likelihood of contracting the disease. The maximum potential of a network of N individuals is log2Nlog2N and the minimum
is zero. Thus we can define a health response to have maximal efficiency when the potential of the propagation network
is zero. This the upper bound of efficiency for a response strategy.
2.2 Measuring disease propagation
Secondary transmission potential In analyzing disease propagation on a particular network topology we need to
examine the probability that a specific individual is part of an infection chain originating at a particular node at a
certain time. In order to link the infection of a susceptible node to a certain originator, the responder must trace those
in the proximity of the infectious originator and work their way through multiple infection chains until there are no
further infected individuals linked to the origin. Let the disease propagation network be a directed graph G(V,E). If
node i gets infected in an disease transmission event si j, and is part of an infection chain that ends at j, then for a event
stk where node k gets infected at time t, the responder must link infection event s
t
k to si j.
Applying the transmission potential metric, we have:
I = E(pi j)
where pi j = Pr[stk is si j] is the probability distribution over all the susceptible nodes in V .
Suppose the disease is seeded by an infection event through a randomly chosen susceptible node within the net-
work. Then after an infinite number of steps, the probability that a randomly chosen individual in the network is
infected is given by stationary distribution of the Markov chain pi. Let q(0) be the initial probability distribution over
individuals where the pathogen is introduced into the network, this is equivalent to the distribution of initial viral load
across susceptible individuals. q(t) then, is the probability distribution of infected nodes at which the pathogen is
present after t steps. (this is also known as the state probability vector of the Markov chain at time t ≥ 0). With in-
creasing t one would like to see that q(t) merges with pi. The rate at which this takes place is known as the convergence
rate of the Markov chain, and the difference itself is called the relative point-wise distance defined as:
∆(t) = maxi
|qti−pii|
pii
(2)
The smaller the relative point-wise distance, faster the convergence, and faster the disease transmission within a
network. It is now easy to see that the maximum transmission potential Pr[x = in f ected|y = in f ectious originator]
the network can provide is the entropy of the stationary distribution of the chain.
Inetwork = E(pi) (3)
.
When P is the transition matrix of the chain it is well known that P has n real eigen-vectors pii and n eigenvalues
λi [49]. By using the relation q(t) = q(0)P(t), we calculate the probability distribution of a node being infected after
having faced a viral load from an infection chain of length t.
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Primary or origin transmission potential: Next, we consider the probability distribution of potential originators of
an infection outbreak. This may also be modeled by a Markovian random walk. For a destination node y, consider all
random walks terminating at y. In order to achieve maximal potential, all these infection chains must be long enough
for the respective state probability vector to converge with the stationary distribution. Since this applies equally to all
originator nodes in the network, the primary transmission potential is given by:
Pr[X = x|y] = 1
N = |V |
.
2.3 Modeling disease spreading as a random walk
To simulate epidemic disease spreading on a network, we use Markov chains. This is a stochastic process that closely
matches the way the disease spreads from an infectious individual to a susceptible individual.
The process of disease spreading wherein a single individual is the source of infection within a population, is
equivalent to first selecting a random individual and then one or more random (susceptible) neighbours of the first
(infectious) individual, repeating this process until there are no more susceptible individuals. Hence we may model
disease spreading as a random walk on the disease propagation graph, with individuals being the states of the Markov
chain process.
Aside from graph topology there are other factors that affect the dynamics of an outbreak. The transmission
potential of the disease from an infected to a susceptible member depends on the infectivity of the disease. Further,
the infectivity of the individual (i.e the progression of the infection within the carrier) varies over time [44] and is
often assumed to follow a Weibull distribution [20, 35]. We will focus on the impact of the topology of the disease
transmission network in this study and ignore the effects of incubation period, generation period, symptom duration
which have been studied elsewhere [31, 20, 27].
3 Public Health Interventions
Having discussed the role of network topology in disease propagation, we now discuss interventions. The responder’s
goal is to deploy passive methods such as disease surveillance and active methods such as quarantining or recommend-
ing self-isolation of individuals within the proximity network. It is natural to ask how these measures can be applied
within a public-health response to achieve the best outcomes.
Intuitively, we can answer this question by stating that the responder should issue isolation/quarantine instructions
according to a strategy that maximises the probability that the outbreak is “intercepted” regardless of the specific
path followed by the chain of disease transmission. We start with the observation that there are principally two ap-
proaches towards achieving an optimal result: vertex-based super-spreader isolation or edge-based super-link isolation
approaches.
3.1 Super-spreader isolation
In vertex-based approaches, the goal is to locate and isolate individuals that play a disproportionate role in disease
spreading i.e pursue super-spreader detection. As one possible definition, super-spreaders are high vertex-order (high
degree) nodes that influence disease propagation due to the numbers of susceptible individuals they interact with.
Vertex-order nodes [40] are special nodes that owing to their position in the network topology broker large amounts
of proximity encounters. The risk of fully visible transmission chains is significantly higher in a topology where
hubs only connect to other hubs, and are responsible for a majority of the network’s proximity encounters. If disease
responders can locate and strategically target individuals that play the role of a hub (super-spreaders) or host a weak-
tie, then the percentage of transmission chains that start and end within the subset of contact-tracing app users can
be significant. This property is known as assortativity [39], defined as the affinity of a node to link to others that are
similar or different in some way.
Vertex-order super-spreaders: In a centralised approach, vertex order is computed by adding up the number of
neighbours for each node. To estimate vertex-order in the decentralised case, we use long random walks. A long
random walk of length O(LogdN) steps where d is the average degree and N = |V | is the population size is used to
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compute the degree distribution on the proximity graph. The stationary distribution of a proximity graph is its degree
distribution. A random walk that is long enough (O(LogN)) to achieve stationarity, results in a probability distribution
over the nodes of the graph which is also its degree distribution. Thus detecting vertex-order super-spreaders in a
decentralised manner is the same as computing the result of a long random walk over a distributed graph. We provide
a concrete privacy-preserving mechanism for this task in Section 4.
3.2 Super-link isolation
A complimentary approach is to isolate proximity links (graph edge) between certain individuals that play an important
role in transmission. Super-links [25] are edges or proximity links that are responsible for significantly reducing
average path-lengths in networks of tightly knit communities such as social networks. This is important in the context
of community transmission of an infectious disease. Super-links inter-connect dense clusters of nodes. Consequently
disabling a super-link seems a natural defense against disease spreading, yet this has not been investigated before.
Better still, disabling a set of k links (a k cut) by preventing those people from getting in close proximity partitions the
graph and stops the spread of the disease with high probability. Here’s why. Consider a k-cut that partitions a graph
into several components of similar size. The likelihood of a node on the tour belonging to the same partition as the
predecessor node is denoted by p, so with 1− p the next node on the tour could belong to a different partition. The
likelihood of a tour comprising all m nodes from the same partition is then given by fp( j,m) where j is the number
of consecutive infected nodes already in the same partition is defined as: fp( j,m) = p fp( j+ 1,m). As m increases,
limm fp(0,m)→ 0 for 0 < p < 1. As a concrete example, for p = 0.5, the likelihood of a 15-step transmission chain
not traversing a mincut, is less than 1 per 65 per million transmission chains (regardless of graph size), decreasing
to almost zero per million transmission chains of 20 steps. Having established that any path taken by the pathogen
will include at least one edge of the mincut, with probability close to 1, what does that mean for spreading efficiency?
The public-health responder can leverage this understanding to construct a highly effective intervention strategy that
maximises her utility regardless of the spreading dynamics — to block all transmission paths by placing monitoring or
quarantine orders to disable transmission along every edge of the k-mincut. Further, the k-mincut presents a theoretical
limit on the number of disjoint transmission chains available to the pathogen, as any chain must involve at least one
edge from the mincut. Note that this includes paths that are not shortest paths between a pair of consecutive nodes on
the proximity graph.
The basic idea is to partition the affected population into multiple disjoint subsets of individuals that are related by
a small (minimal) number of proximity edges, by controlling the edges we hope to control the outbreak. The approach
taken by most of community detection literature [21].
The approach we use in this paper is a combination of short and long random walks to find efficient partitioning
cuts. We do this by applying the Botgrep algorithm [38] which uses short random walks to instrument mixing time
within a partition and to minimise the leakage of walks starting from a partition. Subsequently, Botgrep applies
the probabilistic model from SybilInfer to isolate edges which delineate the subset of the graph where mixing speed
changes. Thus the output of Botgrep is various graph subsets with different mixing characteristics. While conventional
random walks use only the source to determine the probability of edge transition, Botgrep uses a special probability
transition matrix to implement the random walks, where the transition probability between adjacent nodes i, j ∈ V is
min( 1di ,
1
d j
), as opposed to 1di from i to j in Markovian random walks, where di is the degree of node i. The intuition
here is that proximity networks are partitioned by inter-connected islands of proximity encounters, where each island
has a contact pattern that is different to others.
Indeed, the motivation for Botgrep based random-walk partitioning is that the propagation network may not neces-
sarily consist of dense clusters of infections separated by small cuts. While a small-cut is a useful theoretical starting
point, propagation networks may not necessarily contain small-cuts that partition the graph into two or more com-
ponents that are non-trivial in size. Thus a complimentary approach to small-cut detection is offered by the Botgrep
partitioning which combines machine learning with random-walks to identify sub-graphs with different mixing char-
acteristics.
4 Privacy Preserving super-link and super-spreader detection
Proximity information is confidential since it can reveal information about individual habits, movement patterns,
personal and business relationships. Sars-cov-2 is a pandemic and its reach is global. Naturally, this calls for a
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globally coordinated response to the epidemic. Health agencies across the globe have collected proximity traces via
a variety of centralised to fully decentralised collection and processing mechanisms. However, as transportation links
are restored, it becomes important for health agencies to collaboratively mine their data in order to detect super-links
and super-spreaders.
At the same time, organisations and individuals are understandably reluctant to share information about proximity
encounters they collect with others, presenting a barrier to deploying graph analysis techniques. Aggregating all the
data in a centralised store for analysis would be inappropriate, unsafe, as well as attract legal challenges. Even though
medical privacy has been suspended in some countries such as the UK [24], privacy concerns dominate the use of
proximity data for fighting epidemics.
In this section, we present privacy-preserving algorithms for performing the computations necessary for locating
super-spreaders and super-links over a distributed proximity graph. These algorithms support inter-organisational
collaboration without assuming the availability of a centralised service or trusting the collaborating health agencies
with the confidentiality of each other’s data. There are three steps involved here: assembling a distributed graph,
pseudonymous identities, and distributed execution of random walks.
We assume that the agencies will behave in an adversarial manner, and specifically as per a semi-honest model —
whilst they comply with the security protocol they may carry out passive analysis of other agencies data.
4.1 Assembly and anonymisation of the graph
Compute Intersection The proximity information is represented as a graph G = (V,E), where the vertices are
individuals and edges are proximity encounters. The graph is distributed with each participating agency operating over
its part of the graph. G=
⋃m
i=1Gi where Gi = (Vi,Ei) is the subgraph corresponding to the i
th health agency. The first
step is to set up an agreed space of numerical labels assigned to each susceptible, infectious, infected, or recovered
individual that serves the function of addressing individuals. We achieve this by mapping labels to individuals L :
Z|V |→V .
Before we split and assign label spaces to different agencies, we need to find the gateway points, i.e individuals that
appear on the graphs of multiple agencies must be first identified. This is achieved via private set intersection protocols
to compute Vi∩Vj, for all 1≤ i< j ≤ m. A private set intersection protocol allows multiple agencies to compute the
intersection over their vertex set such that each agency learns only the list of elements that is part of the intersection.
A number of protocols for set intersection have been proposed most of the efficient designs [5, 22, 28, 29, 32, 10]
are proposed in the semi-honest model. Notable among these is the Cristofaro-Tsudik scheme where compute time
scales linearly in the number of elements. Some progress has also been made in developing schemes that work with
weakly-malicious adversaries [45] but these are up to three times slower. We propose the use of a protocol that has a
linear runtime cost and linear communication cost in the number of elements in the two sets; i.e., both runtime and
communication costs are O(|Vi|+ |Vj|) [43]. This makes set intersection practical even for quite large sets consisting
of graphs of billions of nodes.
Anonymous label assignment After common individuals are identified, the label assignment proceeds as follows:
the first health agency assigns a random label in the range 0 . . . |V1|−1 to each individual in V1. It also sends to every
other health agency j the labels of individuals in the intersectionV1∩Vj. The next health agency assigns random labels
in its range |V1|..|V1∪V2|−1 to the individuals within its graph V2 \V1. It then sends to each health agency j > 2 the
indices of common individuals, i.e., those in the intersection (V2 \V1)∩Vj. This process is repeated for each agency; at
the end, all individuals inV have a unique label assigned to them, and each agency knows the label for each individual
within its graph Vi.
Assembling the distributed graph To perform a random walk, each health agency needs to learn the degree of
individual nodes, defined as d(v) = ∑mi=1 di(v), where di(v) is the degree of individual v in Gi. The sum can be
computed by a simple protocol [38], which is an extension of Chaum’s dining cryptographer’s protocol [6]. Each
agency i creates m random shares s(i)j ∈Zl such that∑mj=1 s(i)j ≡ di(v) mod l (where l is chosen such that l>maxv d(v)).
Each share s(i)j is sent to agency j. After all shares have been distributed, each agency computes si = ∑
m
j=1 s
( j)
i mod l
and broadcasts it to all the other agencies. Then d(v) = ∑mi=1 si mod l. This protocol is information-theoretically
secure: any set of malicious agencies S only learns the value d(v)−∑ j∈S di(v). The protocol can be executed in
parallel for all individuals v to learn all individual degrees. Note that each agency must include only those edges that
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cover individuals seen by both agencies, i.e., e = (v1,v2) such that v1,v2 ∈ Vi ∩Vj. Whenever a duplicate edge is
detected, one of the agencies drops the edge from its set of edges Ei.
4.2 Distributed disease spread analysis
Together, the agencies analyse the disease spreading over the distributed proximity graph by performing a secure
multiparty matrix-vector multiplication operation. This is constructed from well understood primitives. Given a
transition matrix T (representation of the proximity graph) and a distributed vector of initial infection probabilities~v,
we can compute T~v, the infection spread vector after a single epoch represented by a one random walk step as follows.
Each agency creates matrices Ti such that ∑mi=1Ti = T . At the highest level of distribution, each agency owns just one
row, which defaults to individuals participating directly with their proximity information.
Next, they compute Ti~v in a distributed fashion and compute the final sum at the end. To construct Ti, each agency
sets the transition matrix (Ti) j,k to be 1/deg(v j) for each edge ( j,k) ∈ Ei (after duplicate edges have been removed).
As with most large graphs the transition matrix is sparse and therefore incurs a storage cost of O(|Ei|) O(|Vi|2)
instead of O(N2).
Paillier encryption [42] is used to perform computation on an encrypted vector E(~v). Paillier supports a ho-
momorphism that allows one to compute E(x)⊕E(y) = E(x+ y); it also allows the multiplication by a constant:
c⊗E(x) = E(cx). This, given an encrypted vector E(~v) and a known matrix Ti, it is possible to compute E(Ti~v).
Damga˚rd and Jurik [13] developed an efficient distributed key generation mechanism for Paillier that allows the
creation of a public key K such that no individual health agency knows the private key, but together, they can decrypt
the value. In the full protocol, one agency creates an encrypted vector E(~v) that represents the initial state of the random
walk. This vector is then sent to each agency, who computes E(Ti~v). Finally, the agencies sum up the individual results
to obtain E(∑mi=1Ti~v) = E(T~v). This process can be iterated to obtain E(T k~v). Finally, the agencies jointly decrypt the
result to obtain T k~v.
Note that Paillier operates over members Zn, where n is the product of two large primes. However, the vector~v and
the transition matrices Ti are floating point numbers. To perform real arithmetic over a finite field, we represent floating
point numbers as fixed point numbers by multiplying them by a fixed base storing bx×2cc (equivalently, (x− ε)×2c,
where ε< 2−c). Each multiplication results in changing the position of the fixed point, since:
((x− ε1)×2c)((y− ε2)×2c) = (xy− ε3)×22c
where ε3 < 2−c+1. Therefore, we must ensure that 2kc < n, where k is the number of random walk steps. The maximal
length random walk we use is (logd¯ |V |)2, where d¯ is the average node degree, so k < 40 (allowing epidemic attack
rates of R0 ≤ 40 ), which offers sufficient fixed-point precision to work with for a typical choice of n (1024 or 2048
bits).
Security: Note that each party transmits values encrypted under the public key, and no party involved in this protocol
has a copy of the distributed private key. The Paillier encryption scheme is known to be CPA-secure [42]; thus these
protocols reveal no information about the vector or matrix in the honest-but-curious setting.
Performance: The base privacy-preserving protocols we propose are efficient. However, when the number of indi-
viduals or agencies increase, the operations can expect to take a significant amount of processing time. We estimate the
actual processing costs and bandwidth overhead, using some approximate parameters. Specifically, with a distributed
graph of 10 million individuals, with an average degree of 10 per node.1 Each step of the spreading process would
require O(|E|) multiplications and additions over encrypted values. An efficient implementation [46, 30] over an i7
CPU with 8GB RAM can compute 7200 multiplications and approx. 1 million additions per second using a 2048-bit
encryption key. Thus a single step of disease spreading would take approx. 20000 seconds to compute. We note that
it would be straightforward to apply parallelisation techniques to reduce this compute time by an order of magnitude.
We have excluded the costs of setup time which is a one-off effort.
1The average degree in proximity graphs is likely to be smaller than this value but we are seek conservative estimates.
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5 Experimental Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of intervention strategies, we simulate disease spreading over a number of real-world
graphs and study the impact of interventions.
The simulation is divided into two phases:
In the intervention phase, the responder takes action according to one or more intervention strategies – the selection of
network elements (nodes or edges) subjected to restrictions constitutes an intervention strategy. Restrictions on nodes
may physically manifest in the form of quarantining, self-isolation, or physical distancing measures over individuals.
We consider the following strategies in our study: null response – where the responder does nothing, contact tracing – a
widely used strategy in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, super-spreader suppression, and super-link suppression.
The intervention phase has three associated parameters: first, the intervention strategy chosen by the public-health
responder; second visibility, the proportion of the propagation graph that is visible to the responder; and third isolation
budget, is the proportion of the propagation graph that is subjected to restrictions.
The spreading phase consists of several rounds. In the first round, an initial infection source is selected by choosing
a node uniformly at random within the network. Subsequently, a randomly chosen neighbour of the first infected
individual that is not in isolation contracts the infection. In subsequent rounds, the process repeats, and in each round
for every infected individual that has not been isolated, a randomly chosen neighbour who is not isolated, contracts
the infection. This process repeats until there are no more susceptible individuals. In each round, we measure the
transmission potential to measure the extent of disease spread within the network. It is worth noting that the full
propagation network is available to the pathogen for disease spreading, i.e only the responder has partial visibility
whereas the disease spreads on the full topology.
Dataset: We use real world contact traces from the Brightkite social-proximity network. This consists of 58228 nodes
and 214078 edges. An edge between two nodes indicates a social link. In Brightkite, an edge between individuals is
created when they interact with each other at least ten times. Studies find a close link between the existence of social
links and proximity encounters [8], specifically a substantial social link greatly increases the chances of a proximity
encounter. Specifically, we know that human proximity encounters exhibit structural patterns owing to the influence
of social relationships and geographical constraints. We therefore selected a location-based online social networks to
study the dynamics of disease spreading in response to public-health interventions.
5.1 Baseline – No response
Initially, we simulated disease spreading when no interventions are undertaken within the intervention phase, this
gives us the base case. Figure 1 shows disease propagation over time. Time is divided into multiple rounds with each
round consisting of a unit of time over which all proximity encounters involving a given node and its neighbours takes
place. As explained in section 2.2, we use the transmission potential metric – defined as the the normalised entropy of
infection probabilities of all individuals within a population – to measure disease propagation. In the absence of any
isolation, the transmission potential reaches maximal levels within three rounds. This is consistent with the exponential
increase in the number of cases observed in other epidemiological studies [19, 27].
Figure 1: With no interventions infections spread rapidly achieving maximal spread within a few rounds.
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5.2 Contact tracing and testing
The most popular non-pharmaceutical intervention strategy is contact tracing [11, 3, 24, 19, 17, 50, 21, 51, 48], so it
is natural to use this as a second baseline of comparison. In contact tracing, the intervention phase alternates with the
spreading phase. The first round starts with a fraction of individuals (1% of the population) being randomly chosen
as initial sites of infection. In the spreading phase, each of the chosen initial infection sources infects its neighbours.
This is followed by the intervention phase wherein all infected nodes, and their neighbours (i.e infected individuals and
those in their proximity regardless of infection state) are isolated. The goal of contact tracing is to stop disease spread
by isolating clusters of infected individuals. Following the first round, in each subsequent round, the intervention
phase is followed by the spreading phase. We simulated contact tracing for a total of 20 rounds.
As figure 2 shows, testing and tracing is certainly better than a null intervention. When all or most of the prop-
agation graph is visible, contact tracing works exceedingly well and stops disease propagation in its entirety. This
is of course subject to an adequate isolation budget. When 85% of the population has installed contact tracing apps
i.e visibility of propagation network is equal to or greater than 85% and the responder can ask at least 45% of the
population to be placed in isolation, the disease spread is stopped. Note that the virus itself isn’t eliminated, and an
outbreak can quickly take hold within three rounds, should contact testing and tracing stop. Note that this is the same
result as full lockdown at half the isolation budget (and social cost).
Sadly contact tracing does not fare well at low rates of trace visibility. When less than 60% of the population has
installed contact tracing, we observe a significant increase in transmission potential even when half the population is
under isolation. And, at 10% visibility, contact tracing is almost as ineffective as the null response. We note however
that even at partial visibility of 35%, the transmission potential is halved compared to the null intervention baseline,
with 15% isolation budget.
When less than 85% of the propagation network is visible, we observe that an increase in the isolation budget
has no corresponding impact on the disease spreading potential of the network. This is because the disease spreading
process is occurring outside the visible subset of the propagation network even at medium to high rates of visibility.
Overall, simulations shows that contact tracing is effective at reliably halving transmission potential when at least
60% of the propagation network is visible to the responder. These tests are averaged over 10000 trials.
5.3 Isolating super-links
Having established that contact tracing only works only after a substantial fraction of the population is visible, we now
explore the graph theoretic approach of super-link detection. As before, we start with seed individuals that initially
contract the infection. This group of initial infectees is 1% of the population i.e 580 randomly chosen individuals.
We then simulate disease spreading from one person to another under the influence of restrictions at various rates of
network visibility and isolation budgets.
Disease spreading is studied as a multi-step event. The intervention strategy is applied by the responder using
partial knowledge of network topology and no information about the site of initial infections. Therefore, a trivial
response that involves quarantining all the initial infected population is excluded, as it is not realistic to frequently test
all individuals over short periodic cycles.
In the initial infection step, a randomly chosen subset of the population is declared infected. These individuals
constitute the initial infectious group. Next, super-links (massively influential graph edges) are identified by the
responder who has no knowledge of the initial infectious group. Individuals constituting a super-link graph edge are
subject to isolation limited by the isolation budget i.e a maximum of x|V | nodes may be asked to isolate themselves,
where x is a fraction and |V | is the total population size. On the graph, node isolation is implemented by removing all
its edges from the graph topology. These nodes form the set of infected but non-infectious nodes. Since the isolation
budget is spent upfront, there is no isolation capacity available for demand arising from secondary infections. Thus
disease transmission from infectious individuals arising out of any successful secondary infections will only be stopped
by the removal of all disease transmission paths between infectious and susceptible individuals. This is a significant
ask of any public health response.
In subsequent steps, disease propagation is simulated as spreading from one individual to another. We assume that
all proximity encounters between an infectious and a susceptible individual results in an infection (i.e a 100% attack
rate). R0 is 3.68 in the Brightkite social network. All R0 > 1 are relevant outbreak scenarios, since these infection
rates will lead to an outbreak.
Figure 3 shows amortised results over 10000 randomised simulations. We can observe that proactive isolation
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(a) V = 10%, Q=05% (b) V = 10%, Q=15% (c) V = 10%, Q=25% (d) V = 10%, Q=35% (e) V = 10%, Q=45%
(f) V = 35%, Q=05% (g) V = 35%, Q=15% (h) V = 35%, Q=25% (i) V = 35%, Q=35% (j) V = 35%, Q=45%
(k) V = 60%, Q=05% (l) V = 60%, Q=15% (m) V = 60%, Q=25% (n) V = 60%, Q=35% (o) V = 60%, Q=45%
(p) V = 85%, Q=05% (q) V = 85%, Q=15% (r) V = 85%, Q=25% (s) V = 85%, Q=35% (t) V = 85%, Q=45%
Figure 2: Effectiveness of Contact Tracing and Testing in the Brightkite dataset. V is the fraction of the contact graph
visible to the responder. Q is the fraction of the population asked to self-isolate. For low visibility (corresponding
to low adoption rates of contact tracing apps), there is little impact on spreading even with an isolation budget of up
to 50% of the population. Above 60% adoption, isolating even 15% of the population slows down the spread with
substantial reductions achieved at 50%. At 85% adoption rate, merely isolating 35% of infected people and their
proximity neighbours is enough to stop disease spread.
of super-links can be rather effective in limiting disease propagation. Both visibility and isolation budgets play an
important role. Overall we can observe that a moderate visibility and moderate isolation budget result in flattening
intervention potential (disease propagation) by a factor of 5 to 8, while higher isolation helps reduce the disease spread
to small local clusters and entirely eliminating outbreaks.
Low visibility — low isolation At low levels of graph visibility of 10%, and with a small isolation budget of 5%
(Figure 3(a)), the effectiveness of super-link intervention is expectedly limited. We observe an expansion of numeric
range with a decreasing lower bound. This suggests a decrease in intervention potential (likelihood of contracting the
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(a) V = 10%, Q=05% (b) V = 10%, Q=15% (c) V = 10%, Q=25% (d) V = 10%, Q=35% (e) V = 10%, Q=45%
(f) V = 35%, Q=05% (g) V = 35%, Q=15% (h) V = 35%, Q=25% (i) V = 35%, Q=35% (j) V = 35%, Q=45%
(k) V = 60%, Q=05% (l) V = 60%, Q=15% (m) V = 60%, Q=25% (n) V = 60%, Q=35% (o) V = 60%, Q=45%
(p) V = 85%, Q=05% (q) V = 85%, Q=15% (r) V = 85%, Q=25% (s) V = 85%, Q=35% (t) V = 85%, Q=45%
Figure 3: Effectiveness of super-link intervention in Brightkite graph. At just 10% visibility, the disease spreading
can be fully stopped by isolating 45% with significant reductions achieved at a isolation budget of 15%. At medium
visibility of 35%, disease suppression is achieved by isolating 45% of the population. At high visibility of 85%, just
25% of the population needs to be isolated to fully suppress the disease with significant reduction achieved at 15%
isolation. V is the fraction of the contact graph visible to the responder. Q is the fraction of the population placed
under self-isolation.
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disease) in some cases within each time interval. However, the average remains roughly the same as in the case where
public-health responders don’t intervene (Figure 1). And, by the 20th time interval, the likelihood of contracting the
disease is as high as the baseline case of no response, although the rate of increase is markedly slower in comparison
with the baseline. At exceedingly low budgets super-link detection slows down disease propagation but does not limit
the spread.
Low visibility — medium to high isolation At a slightly increased isolation budget of 15% with graph visibility
still limited to 10%, super-link suppression results in a reduction of disease spread by a decrease of 50% compared to
the baseline case of no intervention. There is further improvement with increase in budgets, with a further five-fold
decrease in the likelihood of contracting the disease when 45% of the population is under restrictions of physical
isolation. In contrast, contact tracing only exhibits a two fold decrease for equivalent visibility and isolation budget.
Medium visibility — low to high isolation As visibility grows to 35%, with a medium budget of 25% isolation
we observe a significant improvement compared to the baseline (Figure 3(h)) – the intervention potential flattens with
disease spread limited to local clusters. A scenario achieved only at high budgets (45%) for low visibility (10%). When
combined with higher isolation budgets (45%) we observe that the disease spread is reduced to its lowest theoretical
limit (Figure- 3(j)).
High visibility With higher visibility the curve flattens further and we observe that each successive 25% increase
in visibility enables 10% reduction in isolation budgets to achieve the same outcome. For instance, 60% visibility
and 35% isolation (Figure 3(s)) has similar impact as 35% visibility and 45% isolation (Figure 3(o)). Similarly, 85%
visibility and 35% isolation (Figure 3(s)) has similar impact as 60% visibility and 45% isolation (Figure 3(o)). In
general, the case of high visibility ≥ 60% is essentially a theoretical scenario as few responders have managed to gain
high visibility into the populations under their care using purely voluntary means.
Overall we find that as visibility grows it results in a better impact on disease propagation with the same isolation
budget, reducing the intervention potential by half from 0.8 to 0.3 (stable values).
5.4 Isolating Super-spreaders
Figure 4 shows the amortised results over 10000 randomised simulations. We can observe that proactive isolation of
super-spreaders is somewhat effective in limiting disease propagation, and it does significantly better than contact trac-
ing, but not as good as super-link detection. Isolation budgets plays an important role compared to visibility. Overall
we can observe that moderate visibility with high isolation budgets result in flattening the transmission potential of the
network from 0.8 to 0.2, which is better than contact tracing but not as good as super-link isolation, which consistently
achieves the lower bound of transmission potential (maximal curve-flattening).
6 Discussion
Topology of disease transmission: The topology of the proximity graph plays an important role in the rate of disease
propagation. Our results indicate that topology has some influence on the ability to stop a disease outbreak. Our
work may pave the way for developing efficient strategies for increasing resilience against an epidemic within a given
population. As it turns out, contact tracing is useful but it is possible to do much better – while contract tracing only
works reasonably well once the visibility is greater than 60%, super-link detection is as effective as contact tracing at
just 10% visibility. This is a significant improvement making graph-based approaches practical.
Collaboration at many scales: Our experiments show that it is possible for multiple entities to safely collaborate
in defending populations against an epidemic, and in the presence of partial observations. These entities can be
as small as individuals (micro-collaboration); or, a regional or national health agency (macro-collaboration); and,
still work with each other (mixed-collaboration). However, several practical issues remain. For best results, macro-
collaborations are likely to lead to better outcomes over micro- or mixed-collaborations due to the economics of
distributed disease propagation analysis. This is because a regional or national health agency working together may
result in a better overall perspective whereas the threshold of the number of individuals working together will be
relatively higher and the one-off costs involved will result in inefficiencies. This calls for efficient protocols for
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(a) V = 10%, Q=05% (b) V = 10%, Q=15% (c) V = 10%, Q=25% (d) V = 10%, Q=35% (e) V = 10%, Q=45%
(f) V = 35%, Q=05% (g) V = 35%, Q=15% (h) V = 35%, Q=25% (i) V = 35%, Q=35% (j) V = 35%, Q=45%
(k) V = 60%, Q=05% (l) V = 60%, Q=15% (m) V = 60%, Q=25% (n) V = 60%, Q=35% (o) V = 60%, Q=45%
(p) V = 85%, Q=05% (q) V = 85%, Q=15% (r) V = 85%, Q=25% (s) V = 85%, Q=35% (t) V = 85%, Q=45%
Figure 4: Effectiveness of super-spreader suppression in Brightkite graph. V is the fraction of the contact graph vis-
ible to the responder. Q is the fraction of the population asked to self-isolate. Even at 10% visibility, propagation is
substantially reduced. Further increase in visibility does not bring additional benefits. Notably, propagation minimi-
sation is not achieved even with high isolation budgets (unlike super-link isolation). Super-Spreaders are easy to spot
but suffers from the need for high isolation budgets. Full suppression of disease transmission not achieved (unlike
super-link strategy) even at the highest visibility and isolation-budget allocations.
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privacy-preserving super-link detection in micro-collaborations. Aside from economics, the security assumption of
semi-honest adversaries lends support to macro-scale collaborations where such assumptions can be codified into a
legally enforceable contract. This is necessary since the encrypted random-walk data may reveal sensitive information
or violate privacy of individuals.
Application and containment: The ability to quickly identify infections via a comprehensive testing regime is a
pre-requisite for a successful intervention via graph-based approaches including super-link isolation. Our technique
can be seen as a sophisticated version of its fat-fingered cousin, the full social lockdown [14] – instead of disabling
all proximity encounters, it is enough to disable a carefully selected fraction as part of a targeted intervention. It is
likely that such a step would be more socially sustainable as opposed to a full social lockdown. It is also important to
note that to be effective, super-link isolation must be applied pre-emptively before the onset of a wave of infections
(outbreak).
Our intervention approach is symptom agnostic – it does not consider whether the person has symptoms or has been
in the proximity of an infected individual. We can see that activities, such as opinion diffusion and more generally all
diffusion processes will also be slowed or stopped by our techniques. We believe that super-link detection needs to be
combined with appropriate testing to identify initial sources of infection. A wholesale application of the technique in
the absence of an appropriate testing regime would be wholly undesirable and counterproductive. Super-Link isolation
is not an societal inoculation strategy nor is it a universal safeguard or defense against the spread of epidemics. It is at
best a carefully chosen strategy as part of a broader public-health response. To read more into it would be unsupported
by scientific evidence.
Limits of conventional epidemiological approaches: A fundamental challenge within current epidemiological
models [17, 19] of disease transmission is the assumption that R0, the mean infections per individual is estimated by
a normal distribution. However, real-world contact graphs have a skewed distribution such as a power-law distribu-
tion [8], since social links influence proximity as well as random chance. Consequently, using R0 to drive a disease
mitigation strategy can result in significant errors. Removing a high vertex-order node might appear as a good strategy
to reduce R0, however a low vertex-order node may play a bigger role in disease spreading due to its ability to connect
multiple clusters.
In general, the vertex-order or node degree at best has a weak relationship to disease spreading as vertex-order is a
poor indicator of node importance. Consequently, since R0 is a function of vertex order, we argue that it is not helpful
in designing an efficient mitigation strategy, although it may be helpful in identifying thresholds of disease outbreaks.
For measuring the effectiveness of interventions, the transmission potential (proposed in this paper) is a better
metric, as it recognises that individuals may be uniquely positioned. It is a function of infection likelihood of all
individuals within a population rather than based on a crude approximation of average infection rates. It is worth
noting that in a power-law distribution the average is not representative of the typical. As such the transmission
potential is well positioned to capture the influence of key elements of the propagation network.
The limits of automated contact tracing: Contact tracing [11, 3, 24, 50, 21, 51, 48] is a commonly applied (or
suggested) public-health response in the face of an infectious disease outbreak. To analyse the effectiveness of this
strategy, we ask the following question provide an analytical argument: Given a set of partial proximity traces (partly
visible proximity graph), what is the probability that a randomly chosen disease transmission chain is fully visible to
the responder?
A network topology with poor expansion properties (or lower eigen-value gap ε= 1−λ2) tends to have relatively
’localized’ outbreaks, so that, given the first individual of an infection chain, there exists a subset of individuals within
the network that have a higher chance of being a part of the chain of transmission than others.
The spectral theory of graphs lends us a few tools, namely chernoff bounds, in quantifying this risk. Suppose
A is the set of individuals who have installed a contact tracing app, and piS the corresponding probability mass of
the stationary distribution pi. The upper bound of the probability that a transmission chain (random walk) of length
t goes through tA nodes of A is given by Gilbert [23]: Pr[tI = t] ≤
(
1+ (1−pi(I))ε10
)
e−t
(1−pi(I))2ε
20 . However, given that
this probability exponentially decreases with increase in t, a small increase in the length of the transmission chain
will negate the benefits of the contact tracing intervention. As t increases the probability that a transmission chain is
fully visible to responders decreases exponentially with the length of the chain. The length of the chain is primarily
a function of the incubation period which is approx. 7 days [2], offering a significant window of opportunity for the
disease to spread. Therefore we argue that contact tracing is a fairly leaky process which while helpful in slowing
down the spread of the disease can by no means prevent its spread, as empirically demonstrated by our experiments.
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Future work: As we have demonstrated, disabling super-links can be effective in slowing down or stopping the
transmission of infectious diseases. The analysis of proximity graphs to identify such elements is a useful approach
towards fighting epidemics. However, many challenges remain to turn this approach into a full-scale intervention
mechanism. We need to:
1. Evaluate the scalability of super-link detection on larger graphs corresponding to populations of tens of millions.
2. Develop efficient set-intersection protocols for the fully malicious setting that can support the use case of epi-
demic response.
3. Develop mechanisms that incentivise organisations at all scales whether public or private to work together in
a coordinated response to epidemic spreading. Only when incentives combine with efficient security protocols
can we expect wholesome collaboration at multiple scales.
4. Test the dynamic case that involves repeated cycles of disease spread and response.
5. A comparative analysis of the information-theoretic epidemic framework we have proposed here with conven-
tional epidemiological frameworks.
7 Related Work
The impact of the SARS-COV-2 virus is near unprecedented: organisations closed, and for the first time in 132 years
Scottish examinations were cancelled. This highlights the need for a more efficient method for controlling the spread of
a virus without enforcing a 100% lockdown. Research in the field recognises this, with a large focus being on contact
tracing mechanisms [11, 3, 24, 50, 21, 51, 48]. Likewise, some have pursued graph based modeling for justifying
contact tracing [19, 17]. This work builds on these contributions, to develop novel non-pharmaceutical techniques
based on isolating super-links and mitigating the need for a nationwide lockdown.
The use of centrality measures to stop disease propagation has been investigated before. Lee et al. [34] were the
first to point out the existence of super-spreaders. They showed that graph centrality metrics can be used to define
super-spreading locations that result in the greatest numbers of infections. They identify super-spreading cities based
on the metrics of degree, closeness, and betweenness. Instead of nodes at the level of cities, our focus is on edges at the
level of individuals. Specifically, we find that the isolation of high-conductance elements within a disease propagation
network efficiently prevents an epidemic outbreak, whereas the isolation of super-spreaders is sub-optimal.
Borgatti [4] explains why: an individual with low vertex order and low vertex centrality (betweenness centrality)
may still play a key role in disease spreading. Our work explains the importance of leveraging high-conductance cuts
or super-links in order to prevent an epidemic outbreak. Accurately, identifying the key players (the super-links) will
allow for a focused use of isolation resources and thus allowing the majority of society to continue as normal.
Colizza et al. work in a similar domain to the super-spreading nature of cities [9]. In their paper, they look at the air
transportation network as a method of identifying and predicting the spread of infectious disease. They make use of a
vertex-edge graph provided by the Air Transport Association to define a relation between the pattern of new emergent
diseases, and the spread in relation to the air transport network. This is important for us, as it proves that graph theory
can be used to model, and identify the spread of disease - this is positive, and shows that the use of vertex-edge graphs
may also be useful to identify super-spreading nodes in a network of individuals.
Chen et al. highlight in their paper a new and more effective way to use graphs to reduce the amount of immuniza-
tion required in a community [7]. In this paper, as before they highlight that most current methods make use of degree
and betweenness of graphs to highlight the key player nodes to be removed. They suggest an alternative method to this
by making use of EGP graphs. This removes the key player nodes, which will be a smaller number, and this has the
impact of a reduction of immunization dosages, as the key player nodes, creating clusters of localised groups. These
localised groups are not longer connected due to the removal of the key player node, which means lesser dosages of
immunizations are required as the virus may not spread to the same extent of not removing key nodes.
In their paper, Kitsak et al. [33] look at using complex networks to identify super spreaders. They correctly
identify, as other researchers in this domain do, degree isn’t necessarily the deciding factor of how spreading will
occur in a network. The focus is on the ability of where in the network an infected node can reach to. That is, if there
are individual clusters on the node, which are separated, and only one cluster is infected, then it’s not possible for the
other uninfected clusters to become infected as there’s no edge (interaction) for the infection to travel across. In this
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paper, they offer an alternative method of identifying the spreaders in a graph by using an algorithm which is robust
and able to identify the key spreaders who would cause connectedness in clusters. This means that those identified
spreaders could be isolated, or avoided, and this would result in an inability of virus spread throughout the network.
8 Conclusion
The past decade has seen tremendous interest and innovation in the area of disease management. Techniques have been
introduced that enable a variety of non-clinical interventions to halt or slow down the spread of infectious diseases
especially in the instance of a pandemic. For some time, the scientific community has discussed whether certain
elements within the proximity network bear a disproportionate responsibility for the spread of an epidemic? While the
obvious candidate has been the notion of super-spreaders — individuals that infect many others, the pursuit of super-
spreaders has been met with scepticism on account of their likely role as key workers such as nurses, bus drivers, and
delivery agents, and police personnel. Our work makes a start on dealing with this question systematically.
We have shown that contact tracing is sub-optimal both analytically and empirically. Simply tracing infected
people, then tracing their proximity contacts in turn and isolating them is not enough. It slows disease spreading but
leaves the transmission potential high, and fails to stop the disease under conditions of partial visibility unless both the
visibility (85%) and the isolation budget (45%) are at their peak.
In contrast, equivalent results are obtained via super-link isolation under low visibility conditions of 10% at the
same isolation budget. Or, under medium graph visibility of 35% and a lower isolation budget of 35%. Overall,
super-link detection is a promising direction but only one of the many promising avenues of graph-based approaches
to epidemic response.
We have also highlighted the limitations of the R0 metric in measuring the impact of interventions. The crudeness
of R0 is due to its reliance on vertex-order properties which poorly estimates the importance of nodes within the
propagation graph. We have proposed the transmission potential metric. Inspired by communications literature, it
measures the capacity of the network to ’carry’ infections from one end to the other and serves as an accurate indicator
of effectiveness of interventions.
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